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MCDONNELL’S MISAPPREHENSION OF THE 
ROLE OF ACCESS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION* 
INTRODUCTION 
Economists often say “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”1 In 
other words, although the recipient may not have to immediately pay 
cash for a “free” item or service, the donor gives the item with the 
expectation of some future benefit. Whether the service is a husband 
washing his wife’s dishes in order to choose that night’s movie or one 
ignoring his boss kicking her golf ball out of the rough to avoid risking 
one’s potential promotion, seemingly benign intentions often have 
strings attached. And, while these motives do not implicate a public 
legal interest when they occur within a marriage or workplace 
relationship, they are alarming in the context of private actors 
interacting with public officials. Public officials are delegates whom 
the electorate trusts to carry out the public’s will—not the will of the 
favored few. When private citizens show up in public officials’ offices 
with free lunches—or something much more valuable—the public’s 
interest is compromised. 
All eight then-sitting United States Supreme Court Justices 
ignored this maxim, however, when they overturned former Virginia 
Governor Bob McDonnell’s bribery conviction in McDonnell v. 
United States.2 In its decision, the Court narrowly construed the 
definition of official act,3 which is an element under most criminal 
public corruption statutes. The Court did so because it feared limiting 
gift-giving constituents’ access to public officials would limit all 
constituents’ access, thus inhibiting the political process.4 However, in 
doing so, the Court did not give adequate consideration to the 
countervailing policy arguments surrounding access in politics and 
misconstrued how federal corruption laws function. The Court acted 
as if only the definition of an official act separated ordinary 
 
 *  © 2018 Jeffrey A. White. 
 1. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH 
(1977) (outlining how all transactions have some bargain attached). 
 2. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016). 
 3. See id. at 2369–71. 
 4. Id. at 2372. 
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constituent services from public corruption, but federal corruption 
laws have multiple elements. Included amongst those elements is a 
mens rea element, which the Court could have used to differentiate 
situations where public officials provide ordinary constituents public 
services and where they corruptly provide special favors to parties 
only because they gave the official a gift. Instead of protecting the 
political process as it hoped, the Court actually weakened 
representative democracy by widening the opportunity for 
preferential access. 
Further, the McDonnell decision incorrectly narrowed the focus 
on which of a public official’s actions constitutes an “official act.” 
Federal public corruption crimes have several elements, and an 
official act is only one of them.5 The Court, however, did not analyze 
how these elements already constrain which “official actions” 
constitute violations, especially the mens rea component. Had the 
Court done so, it would have seen that providing ordinary constituent 
services is illegal only when officials act with some malevolent 
intent—ultimately deviating from their responsibility as a delegate of 
the people. Instead, the Court unnecessarily challenged itself to draw 
a line using only one element instead of all elements.6 In doing so, it 
developed a standard that still may be broad enough for lower courts 
to apply it in good faith but nonetheless make seemingly 
contradictory decisions based on the lower court’s differing policy 
conclusions.7 Consequently, the cramped viewpoint in McDonnell 
creates an impractical distinction when it could have simply relied on 
a public official’s corrupt intent as the way to best protect ordinary 
constituents. 
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides McDonnell’s 
background and the Court’s analysis and policy arguments 
surrounding “official acts.” Part II disputes the Court’s policy 
arguments and explains why it should have been more concerned 
about the role preferential access plays in a public official’s day-to-
day decisions. Part III posits that the mens rea element, not the 
“official act” element, in federal public corruption crimes is the 
correct way to distinguish political access for a concerned constituent 
and a wrongly motivated donor. Finally, Part IV analyzes how federal 
courts have applied McDonnell’s definition of “official act” thus far 
 
 5. 18 U.S.C. §	201(b) (2012) (defining the elements of bribery for public officials); 
§	1951(a) (delineating the elements of Hobbs Act extortion). 
 6. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365–73 (providing multiple elements of bribery and 
Hobbs Act extortion but only addressing the “official act” element in the offenses). 
 7. See id. at 2371–72 (detailing the new official act standard). 
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and considers how this seemingly narrow definition may still give 
courts room to follow this precedent while using contrary policy 
arguments to reach their holdings. 
I.  MCDONNELL’S FACTS AND OUTCOME 
McDonnell centers around a relationship between a company’s 
CEO, a state’s governor, and the state’s first lady. From April 2011 to 
January 2012, Johnnie Williams, then the CEO of the Virginia-based 
company, Star Scientific, gave then Virginia governor Bob 
McDonnell and his wife over $175,000 in gifts and other benefits.8 
Although the McDonnells initially rejected Williams’s offers, 
including his offering to buy Mrs. McDonnell’s inauguration dress, 
they later relented, coincidentally when Williams sought their help 
more regularly.9 The gifts included: a Rolex; a $20,000 shopping 
spree; access to Williams’s private plane, Ferrari, and vacation home; 
and loans when the McDonnells encountered financial difficulty.10 
Although these gifts may seem suspicious, Virginia law, at the time, 
permitted constituents to give public officials unlimited gifts as long 
as the gifts did not improperly influence the official.11 
Unsurprisingly, Williams’s generosity did not go unnoticed by 
Governor McDonnell. 12  When Williams approached Governor 
McDonnell about Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement created by 
Williams’s company, McDonnell listened.13 Williams hoped to have 
Virginia universities study Anatabloc so the product would receive 
the United States Food and Drug Administration’s approval. 14 
Governor McDonnell took several steps to help Williams accomplish 
this goal.15 First, he arranged a meeting between Williams and the 
Virginia Secretary of Health and Human Resources, who could have 
helped Williams convince a Virginia university to perform needed 
research studies for Anatabloc.16 Second, after the Secretary declined 
 
 8. See id. at 2361–64. 
 9. See id. at 2362–64. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Laura Vozzella, Virginia Legislature Adopts Stricter Gift Standards for Public 
Officials, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/virginia-legislature-adopts-stricter-gift-standards/2015/04/17/b400b6a0-e456-11e4-905f-
cc896d379a32_story.html?utm_term=.0fe2e768e7f2 [https://perma.cc/9P2D-8GQH (staff-
uploaded archive)]. In the wake of the McDonnell scandal, Virginia has since added gift-
giving limitations. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. §	2.2-3103.1 (2017). 
 12. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2363. 
 13. See id. at 2362–64. 
 14. Id. at 2362. 
 15. See id. at 2362–64. 
 16. Id. at 2362. 
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to help Williams, McDonnell forwarded even more information to the 
Secretary and requested another meeting, this time with Mrs. 
McDonnell.17 Third, McDonnell hosted Anatabloc’s launch event at 
the governor’s mansion, where he invited university researchers who 
were given $25,000 checks by Williams’s company to create grant 
proposals to study Anatabloc.18 Fourth, McDonnell later hosted a 
healthcare industry reception, which included several guests 
recommended by Williams.19 Fifth, the Governor met with state 
employee healthcare administrators to recommend Anatabloc for 
state employees’ use as a nutritional supplement.20 
After learning of this relationship, federal prosecutors indicted 
Governor McDonnell. 21  They charged McDonnell with violating 
several criminal statutes that punish government officials’ corrupt 
behavior, including honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion, 
on the theory that Williams’s gifts and McDonnell’s acceptance 
constituted bribery. 22  Although the statutes McDonnell allegedly 
violated do not explicitly define bribery, the parties stipulated to 
using the federal bribery statute’s definition. 23  Thus, to convict 
McDonnell for honest services fraud on a theory of bribery, the 
government had to prove that he “directly or indirectly, corruptly” 
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed “‘to receive or 
accept anything of value’ in return for being ‘influenced in the 
 
 17. Id. at 2363. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2364. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2364–65. 
 22. Id. at 2365; see also 18 U.S.C. §	1951(a) (2012) (making a person who “in any way 
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or 
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or 
commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan 
or purpose” guilty of extortion under the Hobbs Act); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358, 404 (2010) (defining honest services fraud, as found in §	1346, as “fraudulent schemes 
to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party 
who had not been deceived”). 
 23. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. The parties chose the definition of bribery found in 
§	201. Id. The statutes criminalizing Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud, which 
the government used to charge McDonnell, do not define bribery or official acts. See 
§§	1346;	1952. However, courts regularly reference §	201’s definition when prosecutors 
bringing honest services fraud or Hobbs Act extortion charges against public officials. See 
Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Defining the Scope Of ‘McDonnell v. United States’, 
N.Y. L.J. (2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977457/25oct2017nylj.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2SAQ-57QA] (“The law governing these statutes has largely converged, with courts 
defining Hobbs Act bribery and honest services fraud by reference to the federal bribery 
statute and treating their precedents as interchangeable.”).  
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performance of any official act.’”24 For the Hobbs Act extortion 
charge, the government needed to prove that McDonnell obtained 
these benefits “knowing that the thing of value was given in return for 
official action.”25 Notably, both charges required an official act, and 
the parties agreed to use the bribery statute’s definition of official act 
for the charges.26 After a jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
the jury found McDonnell guilty of honest services fraud and Hobbs 
Act extortion based on the prosecution’s bribery theory.27 The Fourth 
Circuit later affirmed the convictions.28 
Arguing before the Supreme Court, McDonnell contended that 
the district court judge erroneously instructed the jury about the 
meaning of “official act” within the definition of bribery.29 At trial, 
McDonnell had requested that the jury be instructed that “merely 
arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or 
making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts,’” and “that an 
‘official act’ must intend to or ‘in fact influence a specific official 
decision the government actually makes.’”30 However, the trial court 
rejected these instructions. 31  Without these limiting instructions, 
McDonnell argued that the jury could have impermissibly found that 
any action an official takes would constitute an “official act.”32 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with McDonnell.33 The 
Court narrowly construed the two elements of an official act 
necessary for bribery: (1)	that some “‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy’ [was] .	.	. ‘pending’ or .	.	. ‘brought’ before 
a public official”; and (2)	“that the public official made a decision or 
took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so.”34 
First, it held that the first element requires that the question or 
matter before the official necessitate “a formal exercise of 
 
 24. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (quoting §	201). 
 25. Id. (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 792 F.3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 
136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)). 
 26. Id.; see §	201(a)(3). 
 27. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366. 
 28. Id. at 2367. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2366. 
 31. Id. The trial court instead gave the jury the prosecution’s preferred instruction: 
that an official act “encompassed ‘acts that a public official customarily performs,’ 
including acts ‘in furtherance of longer-term goals’ or ‘in a series of steps to exercise 
influence or achieve an end.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 32. Id. at 2367. 
 33. See id. at 2367–68. 
 34. Id. at 2368 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §	201(a)(3) (2012)).  
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governmental power” in order to resolve it.35 Accordingly, the Court 
found that McDonnell’s act of arranging “typical” meetings outside 
the context of formal proceedings did not satisfy the first element.36 
Second, although it found that three of the governor’s actions did 
meet the first official act element,37 the Court held that arranging a 
meeting, hosting an event, or contacting another government official 
does not sufficiently constitute making a decision or taking action, 
which is necessary for the second element.38 It explained that the 
purpose of these actions was only to discuss a study or to gather 
additional information about Williams’s product, not to “make a 
decision.”39 The Court held that those actions can be “evidence of an 
agreement to take an official act,” but, standing alone, do not 
constitute an official act.40 
The idea of McDonnell’s actions constituting a crime troubled 
the Court. The justices feared that treating his actions as official 
actions would be a slippery slope, such that a public official could face 
criminal charges for helping any constituent with her troubles if that 
constituent had given the official some donation or benefit.41 This 
slippery slope could make public officials less responsive to their 
electorate and citizens less willing to engage with their 
representatives, which would warp “the basic compact underlying 
representative government.” 42  In the end, the Court decided its 
“concern [was] not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball 
gowns,” but rather the harmful impact that may occur from upholding 
the convictions.43 
 
 35. Id. at 2372.  
 36. Id. at 2368. 
 37. Id. at 2369–70. The three “questions or matters” which satisfied the first element 
were:  
(1) ‘whether researchers at any of Virginia’s state universities would initiate a 
study of Anatabloc’; (2) ‘whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and 
Community Revitalization Commission’ would ‘allocate grant money for the study 
of anatabine’; and (3) ‘whether the health insurance plan for state employees in 
Virginia would include Anatabloc as a covered drug.’  
Id. at 2370 (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 792 F.3d 478, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2015), 
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)). 
 38. See id. at 2371. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2371–72 (emphasis added).  
 41. Id. at 2372 (“The Government’s position could cast a pall of potential prosecution 
over these relationships if the union had given a campaign contribution in the past or the 
homeowners invited the official to join them on their annual outing to the ballgame.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2375. 
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II.  THE PROBLEM WITH THE “FERRARIS, ROLEXES, AND BALL 
GOWNS” 
In McDonnell, the Court sought to protect representative 
democracy and the public’s confidence that its government will be 
responsive to the public interest.44 However, the Court’s decision 
actually harms what it aimed to protect. Most Americans already 
question their government’s honesty and true intentions behind its 
decisions, and this ruling will only further undermine the public’s trust 
in its government. Further, McDonnell hinders representative 
democracy. It protects an activity—influencing public officials, at 
least subconsciously, by giving them lavish gifts—that is unnecessary 
and inappropriate in the American political process. 
A. The Court’s Incorrect Perception of Public Opinion 
By saying its “concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, 
Rolexes, and ball gowns,”45 the Court demonstrated its disconnect 
from the public’s opinion. This statement follows a pattern of 
Supreme Court Justices believing that public officials accepting lavish 
gifts and large campaign contributions will not affect their decision 
making or the public’s trust.46 As the Court notoriously stated in 
Citizens United v. FEC,47 “[t]he appearance of influence or access .	.	. 
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”48 
However, this belief is misguided. Four in five Americans already do 
not trust the government, and roughly three in four Americans 
believe that public officials “put [their] own interests ahead of [the] 
country’s.”49 Further, this degree of distrust is not new—Americans 
have felt this way for the past ten years.50 These troubling beliefs and 
patterns may be rooted in the fact that most people believe the 
 
 44. See id. at 2372. 
 45. Id. at 2375. 
 46. See Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1619, 1634 (2017) (“The [McDonnell] Court’s treatment of [public] official 
corruption narrowed the range of political behavior classified as illicit.”). 
 47. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 48. Id. at 360. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United, repeated his 
previous stance that this type of “[f]avoritism and influence are not .	.	. avoidable in 
representative politics.” Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).  
 49. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR 
GOVERNMENT 4 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/11/11-23-2015-Governance
-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY9K-S6WP].  
 50. See Samantha Smith, 6 Key Takeaways About How Americans View Their 
Government, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015
/11/23/6-key-takeaways-about-how-americans-view-their-government/ [https://perma.cc
/VXC2-D37Q]. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1175 (2018) 
1182 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
biggest problem with elected federal officials is that they are 
“[i]nfluenced by special interest money” or are “[c]orrupt.”51 Almost 
seventy-five percent of Americans believe that these officials do not 
care what their constituents think anymore, almost a twenty percent 
increase since 2000.52 The United States has not experienced a ten-
year stretch of this level of skepticism in fifty years.53 
McDonnell’s facts and holding reinforce why most Americans 
view the federal government as corrupt and not responsive to the 
public will. Consider the relationship in McDonnell—a drug 
company’s CEO gained access to a governor through a steady stream 
of extravagant gifts, and the governor subsequently strongly 
advocated for the CEO’s product.54 No honest version of those facts 
can conceal the perception of impropriety that the relationship raises. 
Even the Supreme Court acknowledged “[t]here is no doubt that this 
case is distasteful; it may be worse than that.”55 The public is likely to 
view McDonnell as the Supreme Court unanimously permitting—and 
implicitly supporting—a state’s highest public officer maintaining 
distasteful and tawdry relationships like this. In fact, Virginia officials 
went as far to say that “the public’s confidence was shaken in the 
wake of [McDonnell’s] conviction in federal court.”56 
Virginia’s government attempted to restore the public’s 
confidence by imposing new gift restrictions for its public officials,57 
but the federal government has taken no such step for federal 
officials. Its inaction suggests that the federal government is relying 
on McDonnell’s argument, that upholding McDonnell’s convictions 
would somehow lessen the public’s faith in the government. 58 
However, the data show this belief is a fallacy. 59  Given the 
 
 51. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 49, at 194. 
 52. See Smith, supra note 50. 
 53. See id.; PEW RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNMENT GETS LOWER RATINGS FOR 
HANDLING HEALTH CARE, ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER RESPONSE 1 (2017), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/14104805/12-14-17-Government
-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DB8-59B3] (“Public trust in government .	.	. remains close 
to a historic low. Just 18% say they trust the federal government to do the right thing ‘just 
about always’ or ‘most of the time’ – a figure that has changed very little for more than a 
decade.”).  
 54. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–64 (2016). 
 55. Id. at 2375. 
 56. Patrick Wilson, Virginia Lawmakers Approve New Gift Limit Rules, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Apr. 18, 2015), http://pilotonline.com/news/government/politics/virginia/virginia-
lawmakers-approve-new-gift-limit-rules/article_3bf297a7-ac6b-5501-884b-20cc62733a51.html 
[https://perma.cc/78UK-85DW] (quoting Del. Todd Gilbert (R-Shenandoah County)). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 59. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
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aforementioned public belief that the government acts only in the 
special interests of large benefactors, the tawdry tales and outcome of 
McDonnell will only exacerbate the public’s distrust in government. 
B. Distinguishing Preferential Access to Public Officials from 
Elections 
Critics of McDonnell argue that wealthy individuals may now 
permissibly give gifts to public officials in order to gain access or 
potentially guide their political decisions.60 McDonnell supporters 
respond to this criticism by arguing that this type of access to public 
officials is indistinguishable from campaign contributions.61 However, 
 
 60. See Arlo Devlin-Brown & Stephen Dee, Introduction: The Shifting Sands of 
Public Corruption, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 979, 987 (2017) (“Read alongside the Court’s 
campaign finance decisions, a picture is presented of a political reality in which money for 
access is normal and even an essential feature of a political system in which donations to 
political campaigns are protected speech.”); Eisler, supra note 46, at 1641 (“By describing 
McDonnell’s conduct as prospectively constituent service rather than unequivocally an 
instance of bribery, the Court implies a characterization of politicians as the pawns of 
whichever constituent can offer the strongest incentives to take a particular course of 
action.”); Randall D. Eliason, McDonnell v. United States: A Cramped Vision of Public 
Corruption, GEO. WASH. L. REV.: ON THE DOCKET (July 2, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org
/mcdonnell-v-united-states-a-cramped-vision-of-public-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/E5KY-
6MX8] (“As a result [of McDonnell], those with the means to make substantial personal 
gifts to a politician may now legally obtain access to the corridors of power that is 
unavailable to everyday citizens.”). 
  This negative perception is tempered by the presence of gift restrictions. In 
addition to prohibitions on bribery, the federal government, and many state governments, 
have gift restrictions. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 973–1001 (2017) (describing gift 
restrictions covering members of the House); S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 46–56 (2013) (setting 
out gift restrictions covering members of the Senate); 5 C.F.R. §§	2635.201–.206 (2017) 
(detailing gift restrictions covering employees of the federal executive branch); Legislator 
Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3X2L-
9RB3] (outlining each state’s gift restrictions, if applicable, for state legislators). However, 
these rules have many exceptions. See, e.g., BRYAN KAPPE & PRATEEK REDDY, PUB. 
CITIZEN, GIFT RULES FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1–3 (2011), https://www.citizen.org
/documents/Gift-Rules-Executive-Branch.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PFE-BJQS]; PUB. 
CITIZEN, GIFT RULES FOR CONGRESS 3–6 (2007), https://www.citizen.org/documents/Gift-
Rules-for-Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAR5-XCW7]. Consequently, unsightly gifts 
may still be legally permissible. Further, the public would have to be generally aware of 
these gift restrictions, and their exceptions, to fully dispel this negative perception, which 
is unlikely.  
 61. George D. Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption Enterprise After McDonnell—
Lessons from the Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 989, 993–98 (2017) (evaluating amicus 
briefs supporting McDonnell and finding some arguing the gifts provided to McDonnell 
were permissible campaign contributions or political speech); David Debold, Symposium: 
An Important Victory for Representative Democracy, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 2:50 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-an-important-victory-for-
representative-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/FG44-68YW] (“The danger of [including 
access in the definition of official act] .	.	. starts with the fact that the ‘quid’ in a quid pro 
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campaign contributions are easily distinguishable from gifts to public 
officials. Campaign contributions are more regulated, more limited in 
value, and more common than gifts given directly to public officials. 
Consequently, campaign contributions’ ability to influence a public 
official’s decision making pales in comparison to unregulated gifts 
given outside of the campaign context. 
There are some reasonable comparisons between campaign 
contributions and gifts to public officials. Both often give the donor 
special access to the public official. During political campaigns, 
candidates host fundraisers where donors typically contribute a 
certain amount according to the event’s donation hierarchy. 62 
Accordingly, the higher a donor is in the hierarchy, the more access 
she has to the candidate during the event, such as a special cocktail 
reception or personal one-on-one time with the candidate. 63  In 
addition to access at these events, the candidate’s largest contributors 
could have other ways to share their thoughts and ideas, such as by 
regularly scheduled meetings or telephone calls. Ultimately, one 
could argue these campaign events and special perks for prominent 
donors are equivalent to paying for additional access. Thus, if access 
related to significant campaign contributions is already permitted, 
then individuals seeking a meeting with a public official during his or 
her busy schedule should be given the same ability to get access.64 
However, access related to campaign contributions is different in 
nature and effect than access related to gifts given to public officials. 
Unlike gifts, campaign contributions are heavily regulated. Persons 
can only give $2,700 per election to candidates for federal office and 
only $5,000 each calendar year to political action committees 
 
quo prosecution can be a perfectly lawful thing of value, ranging from campaign 
contributions to something as mundane as a meal reimbursement at the local diner.”); 
Pete Patterson & John Ohlendorf, Symposium: Federal Prosecutors and the Power to Pick 
Defendants, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06
/symposium-federal-prosecutors-and-the-power-to-pick-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/L372-
QFLK] (arguing that a narrower definition of official act is needed because “it is relatively 
easy for the government to prove that an official accepted something of value” like a 
campaign contribution or access). 
 62. See, e.g., EMILY’S LIST, MAKING THE DOUGH RISE: A MANUAL FOR 
CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISERS 36, 38 (2004), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Making
%20the%20Dough%20Rise.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RUH-TNDR]. For example, a 
campaign fundraiser may have donor levels like sponsors, hosts, and co-hosts. See id. at 39. 
 63. See id. at 20, 39. 
 64. See Brown, supra note 61, at 993–98 (evaluating amicus briefs supporting 
McDonnell and finding some arguing the gifts provided to McDonnell were permissible 
campaign contributions or political speech). 
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(“PACs”), which may directly support the candidate.65 In addition, all 
significant campaign contributions are publicly reported, such that 
interested parties can follow the money flowing to candidates.66 Gifts, 
on the other hand, are effectively uncapped because of the numerous 
gift exceptions.67 Further, public officials do not always have to report 
gifts they have received, especially if they were not from lobbyists.68 
Thus, while these two paths to access may appear similar on the 
surface, in reality, our laws treat campaign contributions and gifts to 
public officials quite differently. 
These regulatory distinctions between campaign contributions 
and gifts to public officials are meaningful. First, the $7,700 federal 
campaign contribution ceiling is a much lower total than the $175,000 
in benefits that Williams gave Governor McDonnell.69 Although not 
 
 65. Citizens’ Guide, FED. ELECTION COMM’N http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures
/citizens.shtml# [https://perma.cc/6QDY-ZDGX]. Although individuals may donate an 
unlimited amount of money to a “Super PAC,” those groups likely cannot provide the 
donor the same level of special access because “Super PACs are required to operate 
independently of the candidates they support.” COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, FORMING 
AND OPERATING SUPER PACS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN 
2016, at 4 (2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/05/forming
_and_operating_super_pacs_a_practical_guide_for_political_consultants_in_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZNW5-FCD9]. Most states—but not all—also cap campaign and PAC 
contributions. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO CANDIDATES: 2017-2018 ELECTION CYCLE (2017), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1
/Documents/Elections/Contribution_Limits%20_to_Candidates_%202017-2018_16465.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SS8-24NS] (noting eleven states, including Virginia, who do not cap 
campaign and PAC contributions).  
 66. See Citizens’ Guide, supra note 65. All contributions to candidates’ campaigns are 
publicly available, and all political committees must report donations which exceed $200. 
See id. This is especially important in states, like McDonnell’s home state of Virginia, that 
do not limit campaign contributions. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 
65.  
 67. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	163A-212(f) (2017); H.R. Doc. No. 114-192, at 982–87 
(2017); H.R. Doc. No. 113-18, at 47–50 (2013); 5 C.F.R. §	2635.204 (2017). For further 
discussion of gift restrictions, see supra note 60. 
 68. See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 60 (“Many states place the 
greatest restrictions on gifts from lobbyists to legislators.”); Personal Financial Disclosure: 
Gift and Honorarium Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/research/ethics/personal-financial-disclosure-gift-and-honoraria.aspx [https://perma.cc
/49TZ-EKDS] (last updated June 1, 2014) (outlining the varied disclosure requirements 
states have adopted and finding such requirements in only 36 states).  
 69. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–64 (2016) (describing the 
gifts McDonnell received). Although Williams could have legally donated an equivalent 
amount of cash to McDonnell’s campaign because Virginia does not cap campaign 
contributions, most states have campaign contribution limits similar to the federal one. See 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 65; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (2016); 
Price Index Adjustments for Contributions and Expenditure Limitations, 82 Fed. Reg. 
10904, 10905–06 (Feb. 16, 2017). In addition, the other arguments below for why campaign 
contributions are different than gifts apply to McDonnell’s facts. See infra notes 71–82 and 
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all Americans can afford to donate $7,700 to a candidate, many more 
can give that amount versus Williams’s giving. If more people donate 
the maximum contribution amount—and many do70—the value of the 
access to the candidate during elections is diluted. 
Second, the limited, or sometimes non-existent, gift-reporting 
requirements make it more difficult for the public to evaluate how 
their government representatives may be being influenced.71 Perhaps 
even more importantly, this lack of information prevents state ethics 
commissions and prosecutors from monitoring public officials and 
holding them accountable for potential corruption.72 This distinction 
is especially important in states that do not limit campaign 
contributions.73 Although individuals in these states can attempt to 
influence public officials through both lavish campaign contributions 
and gifts, the public can find out about the lavish campaign 
contributions because of their reporting requirements.74 The same is 
not true for gifts because of their more lax reporting requirements.75 
Third, public officials may implicitly attribute different meanings 
to campaign contributions and personal gifts. During a campaign, 
officials are constantly attending fundraisers and are receiving 
numerous donations. Each donation may not feel as special or 
important. Conversely, once the official is in office, and the steady 
stream of generosity diminishes, their judgment and ability to remain 
impartial could be more tested by gifts. These varying perceptions are 
further bolstered by the fact that public officials use campaign 
 
accompanying text. Further, the dilution argument, see infra note 70 and accompanying 
text, also applies to states that allow unlimited campaign contributions since multiple high-
dollar donors are competing for access to their donees. 
 70. According to the FEC, roughly 482,000 individual contributors gave at least $2,700 
to political candidates or organizations during the 2015-2016 election cycle—and that’s just 
for federal elections. Individual Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ (filter for 2015–16 under 
“Transaction Time Period” and more than $2,700 under “Contribution Amount”). About 
72,000 gave at least $7,700 or more. Individual Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ (filter for 2015–16 under 
“Transaction Time Period” and more than $7,700 under “Contribution Amount”). 
 71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Campaign contributions have more 
stringent reporting requirements, see Citizens’ Guide, supra note 65, so ethics commissions 
and prosecutors are better able to use those reports to identify and address corrupt 
behavior.  
 73. See generally NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 65 (listing the states 
that do not have campaign contribution limits). 
 74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why almost every 
campaign contribution can be identified, despite efforts to obfuscate a donor’s identity and 
donation amount, see infra note 81.  
 75. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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donations and gifts differently. Donations to politician’s campaign go 
directly to the campaign and can only be used for limited purposes, 
like advertising and travel.76 The politician cannot convert these 
donations to personal use.77 Gifts, on the other hand, go directly to 
the official and are fully at the official’s disposal for personal 
enjoyment. As a result, these differences mean that gifts likely have a 
greater effect than campaign contributions, so they should not be 
perceived as the same. 
Lastly, the final flaw in the argument that all preferential access 
is the same is the difference in donors’ intent. Campaign contributors 
may have mixed motivations for their donations. A campaign 
contributor, even if he gives with the intent to bribe the official, can at 
least say his donation went toward a legitimate purpose, such as 
helping elect leaders who share their values.78 However, as one 
scholar points out, “secret gifts to a politician have no legitimate or 
legally recognized purpose and automatically have the whiff of 
corruption about them.” 79  In fact, the true similarity between 
campaign contributions and gifts is how the law treats a donor’s bad 
intentions. Even in Citizens United, when the Court notoriously 
opened the door for more money to enter politics, the majority 
opinion stated that campaign contributions can lead to bribery 
convictions, based on the donor’s corrupt intentions. 80  Although 
identifying a campaign contributor’s intent may be difficult, at least 
the contributor’s identity and donation amount are most likely public 
information.81 The same cannot be said for gifts.82 Consequently, gifts 
 
 76. See 52 U.S.C. §	30114(a) (2016) (describing “permitted uses” of campaign 
contributions); Personal Use, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/personal-use/ [https://perma.cc/H8HM-
97E4] (offering examples of permissible uses of campaign contributions). 
 77. See §	30114(b) (prohibiting “personal use” of campaign contributions); Personal 
Use, supra note 76 (distinguishing between and providing examples of prohibited personal 
and permissible non-personal uses of campaign contributions). 
 78. See Randall D. Eliason, Selling Access: Trump and the Legacy of Bob McDonnell, 
LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885088/selling-access-
trump-and-the-legacy-of-bob-mcdonnell/ [https://perma.cc/X72L-7W36 (staff-uploaded 
archive)]; see also Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and 
Ideology, 69 POL. RES. Q. 148, 154 (2016) (detailing the various reasons people donate to 
political campaigns). 
 79. See Eliason, supra note 78. 
 80. Citizen’s United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
 81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. A campaign contributor could avoid her 
identity being attached to the donation by donating to a candidate through a company’s 
PAC. However, these types of contributions are unlikely to be intended, or at least 
unlikely to be effective, as bribes. First, for an individual to make a successful bribe, she 
needs to show the official the commitment she made in order for the official to act in a 
certain way. If her name is not attached to a specific donation, it would be difficult for the 
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do not share the same importance or impact in the political process, 
so the Court should treat them differently. 
III.  WHERE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DRAWN THE LINE 
The Court’s constrained view of bribery led it to insert 
unwarranted policy concerns into its opinion. Instead of evaluating 
the confluence of all bribery elements, the Court made it seem as if a 
conviction solely rested on the “official act” element.83 If that were 
actually the case, its policy concerns may have been warranted. An 
“official act,” however, is just one of five elements of bribery.84 
Instead of focusing so much on the “official act” element, the Court 
should have focused on bribery’s mens rea element to ensure 
ordinary political participation does not constitute bribery. As a 
result, the Court in McDonnell misconstrued these public corruption 
statutes and created troubling precedent. 
A. Improper Use of the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine 
The McDonnell decision’s concern with a broader definition of 
an official act resembled the Court avoiding a constitutional question. 
 
public official to know that the briber has upheld her end of the bargain. Second, even if 
someone created a shell corporation to funnel donations to a candidate as a way to keep 
the donor’s identity out of the campaign contribution disclosures, this effort would most 
likely not prevent the public from still identifying the donor. Someone looking to identify 
the people behind a corporation or LLC’s large political donation could simply identify 
the registered organization’s home state and then view that registered organization’s 
public documents to ascertain the people behind the donation. Thus, the donor would still 
risk her bribe being identified. Third, even if the donor attempted to bribe a politician by 
donating to a related nonprofit organization usually not required to disclose their donor’s 
identities, 26 C.F.R. §	301.6104(b)(1) (2017), the donor nonetheless faces significant 
challenges. Those groups’ activity face even greater restrictions than Super PACs—they 
cannot coordinate their efforts with the candidates they support, and political activity 
cannot be the majority of the organization’s expenditures nor its primary purpose. See 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“By definition, an independent expenditure is political 
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.”). See 
generally B. HOLLY SCHADLER, BOLDER ADVOCACY, THE CONNECTION: STRATEGIES 
FOR CREATING AND OPERATING 501(C)(3)S, 501(C)(4)S AND POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2012), https://www.bolderadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012
/10/The_Connection_paywall.pdf [https://perma.cc/X26B-SMGK] (detailing federal 
requirements for and restrictions on political activity by 501(c)(4) and similar groups). As 
a result, these significant challenges mitigate the risk that a donor could successfully bribe 
a public official and go undetected by the public, and law enforcement, by using the above 
methods. 
 82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 83. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2325, 2367 (providing multiple 
elements of bribery and Hobbs Act extortion but only addressing the ‘official act’ element 
in the offenses). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. §	201(b) (2012) (defining the crime of bribery). 
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As a general practice, the Court makes every effort to determine a 
case on statutory grounds without ever reaching the constitutional 
issue.85 The Court seemingly invoked this doctrine when it questioned 
how the government’s broader definition of official act would affect 
the political process.86 When doing so, the Court noted “significant 
constitutional concerns” with a broader definition, but it never 
explicitly explained what those concerns were.87  Justice Roberts, 
writing for the unanimous Court, said “that public officials will hear 
from their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns,” and 
“conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, 
contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all 
the time.”88 He argued that the government’s construction could 
make officials “wonder whether they could respond to even the most 
commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate 
concerns might shrink from participating in democratic discourse.”89 
Doing so would undermine “[t]he basic compact underlying 
representative government.”90 
However, the Court was misguided in believing that the type of 
preferential access is part of “[t]he basic compact” of our 
democracy.91 The Court rightfully should want to protect common 
constituent services, but the relationship between Johnnie Williams 
and Governor McDonnell was not a typical constituent-public official 
relationship. The benefits Williams gave Governor McDonnell go far 
beyond some de minimis item a constituent may give a public official 
as a way of thanking her for her service, like a hot dog at a Memorial 
Day cookout. Even if the law does not prohibit the public official 
from accepting the gift, it begins to price access to one’s 
representative. That practice is a slippery slope.92 Thus, the Court 
 
 85. E.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the 
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it 
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
 86. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 87. Id.; see Brown, supra note 61, at 1001 (noting that the McDonnell Court did not 
explain what its constitutional concerns were but explains the “likely candidates are 
federalism and political process concerns”). 
 88. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Fred Wertheimer, Symposium: McDonnell Decision Substantially Weakens the 
Government’s Ability to Prevent Corruption and Protect Citizens, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 
2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-mcdonnell-decision-
substantially-weakens-the-governments-bbility-to-prevent-corruption-and-protect-
citizens/ [https://perma.cc/A7G7-TSHY]. 
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needlessly invoked the constitutional avoidance doctrine when 
addressing the issues and should not continue to feel constrained for 
these reasons when deciding public corruption issues. Instead, only its 
statutory analysis should hold precedential value.93 
B. Using the Mens Rea Element to Protect Constituent Services 
The Court could have avoided any apprehension about 
undermining the political process by considering the mens rea 
element of bribery and other public corruption criminal statutes. To 
establish an honest services fraud, Hobbs Act extortion, and/or 
bribery charge against a public official, the government must 
“establish three legs of a stool: a ‘quid’ (the thing of value provided to 
the public official), a ‘quo’ (an official action), and a ‘pro’ (that the 
one thing was in exchange for the other).”94 So, for each of these 
statutes, including those used to prosecute McDonnell, the 
government must prove some intent—that the public official accepted 
the benefit knowing he or she would need to do some specific act to 
return the favor.95 Analyzing the definition of bribery shows this. To 
successfully prosecute a public official for bribery, the government 
must prove each of five elements: “(1) a public official (2) with 
corrupt intent (3) receives a benefit (4) given with the intent to 
 
 93. See Brown, supra note 61, at 1001–03 (noting additional reasons for why 
“[r]eading McDonnell as primarily a constitutional case would be a stretch”). 
 94. Arlo Devlin-Brown & Erin Monju, Public Corruption Prosecutions and Defenses 
Post-‘McDonnell’, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal
/almID/1202777763569/public-corruption-prosecutions-and-defenses-postmcdonnell/ 
[https://perma.cc/2546-DYP4 (staff-uploaded archive)]; see 18 U.S.C. §	201(b) (2012) 
(“Whoever .	.	. being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or 
indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept 
anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being 
influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in 
committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission 
of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in 
violation of the official duty of such official or person”); see also Devlin-Brown & Dee, 
supra note 60, at 986 (applying the “stool” concept to hypothetical examples). 
 95. In McDonnell, the Court specifically viewed the Hobbs Act as requiring the public 
official to “know[] that the thing of value was given in return for official action.” 
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. McDonnell, 792 
F.3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2325 (2017)). Honest services fraud requires 
proving fraud, so the public official must have had some bad intent when accepting the 
money or property. See §	1343; Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010). 
Moreover, parties often agree to define honest services fraud with reference to the federal 
bribery statute, which is codified at §	201. See, e.g., McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. This 
makes sense in light of the Skilling Court’s decision to interpret honest services fraud as 
“encompass[ing] only bribery and kickback schemes.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412. 
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influence (5) an official act.”96 This “corrupt intent” element is the 
mens rea element, as a public official is not guilty of bribery unless 
she “corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive 
or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or 
entity.”97 
These public corruption statutory schemes, exemplified by 
bribery, show that only public officials with malevolent intentions will 
be punished. By using these requirements, Congress demonstrated 
that it only sought to punish public officials who actively choose to 
follow one individual’s or group’s interests, instead of their 
electorate’s interests, because of some benefit the person or group 
provided.98 Ordinary constituent services, which the McDonnell Court 
feared would be encompassed by a broader definition of official act,99 
will not constitute corruption because ordinary services, by their very 
nature, are performed without the requisite corrupt intent. If ordinary 
constituent services are such an important part of a public official’s 
job, as the Court argued,100 a public official providing these services 
alone would not satisfy the mens rea element. 
In addition, because these constituent services are so important, 
it does not make sense to effectively exempt them from corruption 
 
 96. The Supreme Court, 2015 Term–Leading Cases, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 473 
(2016) (delineating 18 U.S.C. §	201’s definition of bribery into five elements). 
 97. §	201(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 98. This argument does not suggest that public officials should always follow the will 
of the majority of the electorate. American history demonstrates the danger of following 
only the will of the majority, especially as it relates to minority groups’ rights. See 
Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164 (1977) 
(stating that the concern that the majority will disregard minority interests when exercising 
power is as old as the nation and democracy itself). See generally ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., 
2010) (1835) (outlining how American majoritarian rule could compromise the 
fundamental rights of minorities); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Rule of Law and the 
Judicial Function in the World Today, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1383 (2014) (noting a 
study showing that America, compared to other countries, “‘lag[s] behind’ for failing to 
provide disadvantaged persons access to the legal system” and explaining that the 
American political process “has a way of becoming tyrannical, reflecting little more than 
the arbitrary will of a simple majority, perfectly willing to run roughshod over the 
desires—and, indeed, the rights—of the unfavored minority”). Also, a minority argument 
can be more persuasive to a public official without the minority party providing the official 
some benefit. Rather, the mens rea element targets situations where public officials take a 
certain action or position because of a personal gain which stems from taking that 
position. 
 99. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 100. See id. 
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laws. Yet that is exactly what the Court seems to suggest.101 If 
constituent services are indeed part of “[t]he basic compact 
underlying representative government,”102 the law should ensure that 
constituents can get these services without having to give the public 
official some benefit. If corruption laws are not applied to ordinary 
constituent services, public officials could require a payment or 
service in exchange for assisting with a constituent’s passport request, 
disability insurance case, or Veterans Affairs claim for life-changing 
medical care. That scenario would put a price on representation, 
which does not seem to comport with American representative 
democracy. Consequently, focusing on public officials’ intent when 
they act in exchange for some benefit would better ensure a more 
responsive democracy as opposed to narrowing the definition of 
official act. It also would more directly address the public’s 
overwhelming concern that their public officials do not act in the 
electorate’s interest.103 Instead of using a head-scratching, highly fact-
specific definition of an official act, courts can protect the political 
process by faithfully applying the mens rea element of public 
corruption statutes.104 
Utilizing the mens rea element in this gatekeeper fashion does 
raise some challenges. Although Congress demonstrated that it only 
wanted to punish public officials who acted “corruptly,” it did not 
define “corruptly” within the bribery statute.105 Without this statutory 
definition, social norms may weigh most heavily in a factfinder’s 
determination of when an official “corruptly” acted.106 As a result, 
 
 101. See id. (rejecting the Government’s argument that ordinary constituent services—
such as connecting constituents with other public officials—are included in the meaning of 
“official act” under §	201).  
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 104. Had the McDonnell court relied more on the statute’s mens rea element instead 
of the official act element, it may have upheld McDonnell’s conviction. See Eliason, supra 
note 60 (“The nature of the gifts themselves was substantial evidence of a corrupt 
agreement.	.	.	. By focusing exclusively on the particular trees of McDonnell’s actions 
rather than the entire quid pro quo agreement, the Court missed the corrupt forest that 
was the relationship between McDonnell and Williams.”). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. §	201(b)(2) (2012); see Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 
103 GEO. L.J. 547, 567 (2015). Even in instances where Congress has defined “corruptly,” 
the definition uses terms courts have struggled to precisely define, especially as to whether 
the official had to consciously disregard the law. Buell, supra, at 566–67 (highlighting 
courts’ treatment of corrupt intent under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 106. See Buell, supra note 105, at 551–54, 570 (“[B]ribery is based on the idea of 
corruption, which is legally useful not as a formal concept in the air but as a structure for 
contextual inquiry into social norms.”). Buell suggests that bribery should be redefined as 
“making an offer to give something of value to another for the purpose of influencing that 
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different factfinders may understand this term differently, potentially 
creating ambiguity in precedent and, subsequently, some 
unpredictability.107 
Even with these risks, relying more on bribery’s mens rea 
element is the better approach for protecting public officials’ ability 
to respond to constituents. First, individuals are unlikely to construe 
the term “corruptly” so many different ways. At its root, the term 
connotes some bad intention. Based on McDonnell, the Court 
believes public officials effectively responding to constituents’ 
concerns is a very good thing,108 so doing so would be far from acting 
with bad intentions. This baseline understanding, combined with 
bribery’s other four elements, prevents courts from using the mens 
rea element as a blank check to convict public officials. Second, the 
“official act” element, and especially the McDonnell opinion’s 
interpretation of it, creates ambiguity in its own right.109 Although the 
Court provide some examples of the new definition—“a decision or 
action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ 
.	.	. involv[ing] a formal exercise of governmental power”110—each of 
the three major parts of this definition is susceptible to different 
interpretations. Instead of giving juries one potentially ambiguous 
term—corrupt intent—to construe, the McDonnell approach instead 
asks juries to interpret three potentially ambiguous parts of just one of 
the five elements of bribery. Thus, the McDonnell approach likely 
creates even more unpredictability. As a result, greater reliance on 
bribery’s mens rea element is a better way to protect the country’s 
political process and representative democracy. 
IV.  COURTS MOVING FORWARD FROM MCDONNELL 
McDonnell’s impact will be difficult to measure. It will likely 
affect prosecutors’ decision to move forward with public corruption 
 
person’s performance of an official or fiduciary function in a manner known to be 
wrongfully influenced.” Id. at 596.  
 107. Commentators frequently attack this sort of statutory vagueness especially in the 
criminal context, arguing that it gives the government too much discretion. See, e.g., 
Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails to 
Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 189, 218–19 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should invalidate honest 
services fraud because it is unconstitutionally vague).  
 108. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016); see supra notes 88–
90 and accompanying text. 
 109. Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 204–05 (“[T]he Court’s application 
of this standard immediately muddies the waters.”). 
 110. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (quoting §	201(a)(3)). 
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investigations, but prosecutorial calculus is not usually broadcast 
publicly.111 As a result, the only reliable way to measure the decision’s 
impact will be to evaluate how courts apply McDonnell to different 
sets of facts. Only minimal takeaways can be reasonably gleaned from 
recent lower court decisions, so future cases are necessary to develop 
the scope of McDonnell. Even then, McDonnell’s fact-specific 
limitations may blur any takeaways from courts’ treatment of the 
case.112 
A. Courts’ Application of McDonnell 
The Court’s decision in McDonnell led many defendants to 
appeal their prior convictions or to move to dismiss their indictment, 
hoping that they may receive a new trial with updated jury 
instructions. 113  Several commentators predicted that McDonnell 
would not have a significant impact on corruption charges and 
convictions,114 and district courts’ rulings on cases pending when 
 
 111. When prosecutors choose to not pursue a conviction because of McDonnell’s 
official act requirements, it will be up to journalists to uncover “tawdry tales” and then 
analyze those facts, which may be without the full context of the situation. However, one 
measurable impact on prosecutors could be heightened pleading standards. A district 
judge is currently deciding whether McDonnell requires prosecutors to identify specific 
official acts in a defendant’s indictment, or whether McDonnell only affects jury 
instructions. See William Gorta, Feds Say UN Bribery Suspect Started ‘Interrogation’, 
LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/896674/feds-say-un-
bribery-suspect-started-interrogation [https://perma.cc/Y7NE-6LBW (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
  One former federal prosecutor, writing as a co-author, does not think McDonnell 
will greatly affect prosecutors when they decide whether to charge a public official with 
corruption crimes. See Devlin-Brown & Dee, supra note 60, at 985–86 (“The reality is that 
McDonnell only precludes prosecutions where the government’s theory is that the public 
official agreed to provide preferential access rather than an actual exercise of 
governmental power. However, prosecutors do not usually bring cases alleging that mere 
official access was the only goal of the corrupt scheme. Instead, prosecutors allege that the 
corrupt scheme involved at least the intended exercise of governmental power to benefit 
the briber payer, regardless of whether the scheme was ultimately successful.”). 
 112. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (describing how the Court applied 
its new narrow definition of official act only to meetings between McDonnell and other 
public officials). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 17-3868, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25061, at *1–3 
(6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017); United States v. Skelos, 707 Fed. App’x 733, 736 (2d Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Chapman, 
No. 16-199-01, 02, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8483, at *9 n.24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2017); United 
States v. Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d 308, 310–11 (E.D. Pa. 2016); United States v. Reed, 
No. 15-100, 2016 WL 6946983, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2016). 
 114. See Devlin-Brown & Monju, supra note 94 (explaining that “McDonnell is of 
limited significance” and would only bar “the weakest of public corruption cases”); The 
Supreme Court, 2015 Term Leading Cases, supra note 96, at 467 (listing a number of 
“qualifications” that “reduce the likelihood that the decision will hamper future 
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McDonnell was decided have generally supported those 
predictions.115 
However, appellate courts, and district courts on motions for 
release pending appeal, have been more generous when considering 
appeals on these grounds. Several have decided that the McDonnell-
based appeals raised a substantial question.116 For example, in United 
States v. Tavares,117 the First Circuit used McDonnell’s official act 
construction to reverse the defendant’s Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) conviction, which was based on 
nine violations of a Massachusetts gratuities statute. 118  The 
Massachusetts statute at issue requires an “official act,” so the court 
applied the McDonnell interpretation.119 The First Circuit then relied 
on the second element of McDonnell’s official act standard, which 
requires acting on a specific question.120 Although the evidence may 
have shown that the defendant appointed individuals to jobs because 
a legislator told him to do so, the court did not find that the legislator 
returned the favor—taking some official act based on the defendant’s 
request.121 The First Circuit reasoned that the defendant’s acts looked 
more like “building up ‘a reservoir of goodwill,’” and that alone “is 
not sufficient to show a specific public act” under McDonnell.122 
 
prosecutions”). But see Wertheimer, supra note 92 (expressing concerns that the Court’s 
decision “substantially weakened the legal protections that currently exist against 
government corruption”). 
 115. See, e.g., Chapman, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8483, at *9 n.24 (rejecting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the honest services fraud charge but noting that 
McDonnell’s construction of “official act” would be used); United States v. Lee, No. 
1:15CR445, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174984, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2016) (denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on theory that the alleged acts were not official 
acts); Reed, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163275, at *19 (denying McDonnell’s application to the 
defendant’s case because statutes for which the defendant allegedly violated—wire fraud 
and money laundering—did not contain the words “official act”). 
 116. Tavares, 844 F.3d at 54; Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (finding McDonnell’s 
changes raised enough of a substantial question in conviction over scheme where 
defendants tried to get one an ambassadorship and hire another’s girlfriend to 
congressional staff). In Vederman, defendant’s motion for release pending appeal was 
granted. Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 311. This court clearly valued the issue, too, as it did 
not grant a co-defendant’s motion because he failed to raise this issue. See United States v. 
Fattah, 224 F. Supp. 3d 443, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 117. 844 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 118. Id. at 54. 
 119. See id. at 56–57. 
 120. See id. at 57–58. 
 121. Id. at 58. 
 122. Id. (quoting United States v. Sun–Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 405 
(1999)). 
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The Second Circuit has been the most active circuit court in 
adjudicating McDonnell-based appeals, serving as a guidepost for 
McDonnell’s impact on public corruption law.123 In 2017, the court 
issued three decisions in federal cases involving corruption 
convictions of state public officials.124 Each of these cases was decided 
before McDonnell, so the defendants, on appeal, argued that the jury 
which convicted them may have relied on jury instructions or facts 
that did not satisfy McDonnell’s narrower definition of official act.125 
The Second Circuit upheld one corruption conviction126 but vacated 
and remanded the other two convictions.127 In each case, the appeals 
court closely examined the trial court’s jury instructions.128 In United 
States v. Boyland,129 the court—and the prosecution—acknowledged 
that some of the jury instructions “were erroneous in light of 
McDonnell,” but the court nonetheless upheld the conviction.130 It 
pointed out that the defendant did not object to these jury 
instructions during trial,131 and the court reasoned that these errors 
did not “affect[] Boyland’s substantial rights” because the official’s 
actions—getting approval from city and state governments for 
permits, licenses, grants, and other favors—clearly satisfied 
 
 123. Some practitioners expect McDonnell to have the biggest impact in the Second 
Circuit because of how active the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New 
York has been in bringing corruption cases. See The Second Circuit Clarifies Corruption 
Standards Following Supreme Court’s McDonnell Decision, ALERT MEMORANDUM 
(Cleary Gottlieb, New York, N.Y.), July 20, 2017, at 2, https://www.clearygottlieb.com
/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/second-circuit-clarifies
-corruption-standards-7-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B6R-WJ2X] (“The McDonnell 
decision potentially stands to have its largest impact in the Second Circuit, which had 
previously taken a broad view of official acts, and has seen numerous federal public 
corruption prosecutions in the last several years—including the convictions of 14 New 
York State legislators in the past 10 years alone.”). 
 124. United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Silver, 
864 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 735–36 (2d Cir. 
2017); see Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Limits on the Scope of Honest Services 
Fraud, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites
/newyorklawjournal/2017/11/06/limits-on-the-scope-of-honest-services-fraud/ [https://perma.cc
/C3DG-X6M8 (staff-uploaded archive)] (analyzing the impact of McDonnell and 
McDonnell-based appeals in the Second Circuit on honest services fraud law).  
 125. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 281–82; Silver, 864 F.3d at 105–06; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 
736. 
 126. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 282. 
 127. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. 
 128. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 287; Silver, 864 F.3d at 112; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. 
 129. 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 130. Id. at 288. 
 131. Id. 
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McDonnell’s definition of official act.132 Conversely, in United States 
v. Silver133 and United States v. Skelos,134 the Second Circuit found the 
opposite to be true.135 In both cases, the defendants objected to the 
jury instructions at trial, and the court found that jury instructions, 
now erroneous because of McDonnell’s new definition of official act, 
could have led the jury to convict the defendants for conduct that is 
lawful under McDonnell.136 However, the court in both cases rejected 
the defendants’ arguments that the prosecution lacked sufficient 
evidence to garner a conviction, resulting in the court only vacating 
the convictions as opposed to reversing them.137 As a result, it opened 
the door for the government to retry the cases, and the United States 
Attorney’s Office is currently in the process of doing just that.138 
More decisions like Tavares and these Second Circuit cases are 
needed to draw proper conclusions about how courts will treat 
McDonnell. 139  Circuit courts are now hearing McDonnell-based 
 
 132. Id. at 291–92 (“In sum, all of Boyland’s dealings .	.	. involved concrete matters 
that, in order to proceed, needed to be brought before public officials or agencies that 
would have to make formal and focused administrative decisions.	.	.	. Although the jury 
was not instructed as to its need to find that the matters were concrete, that they required 
focused governmental decisions, and that Boyland took action on these matters, we see no 
reasonable possibility, in light of the record as a whole, that that flaw affected the outcome 
of the case.”). 
 133. 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 134. 707 F. App’x 733 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 135. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. 
 136. Silver, 864 F.3d at 119 (“[W]e cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
rational jury would have found Silver guilty if it had been properly instructed on the 
definition of an official act. While the Government presented evidence of acts that remain 
“official” under McDonnell, the jury may have convicted Silver for conduct that is not 
unlawful, and a properly instructed jury might have reached a different conclusion.”); 
Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 737 (“When we consider the defective jury charge together with 
these arguments and the lack of instruction cautioning the jury that a meeting 
is	not	official action, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant[s] guilty absent the error.’” (quoting Silver, 864 F.3d at 
119)).  
 137. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. 
 138. See Elizabeth Rosner & Kaja Whitehouse, Dean Skelos and His Son Get New 
Trial Date in Corruption Case, N.Y. POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:02 PM), https://nypost.com
/2017/10/31/dean-skelos-and-his-son-get-new-trial-date-in-corruption-case/ [https://perma.cc
/MQ9R-456X]. 
 139. All interested parties lost a great opportunity to clarify this standard when the 
government decided to not retry McDonnell’s case. Amy Howe, Prosecutors Move to 
Dismiss Charges Against McDonnells, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 8, 2016, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/prosecutors-move-to-dismiss-charges-against-mcdonnells/ 
[https://perma.cc/CZC4-2YKA]. To do so, the prosecution’s theory would be that by 
meeting with the officials, McDonnell was trying to pressure them into researching the 
supplement, and that pressuring is sufficient. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 
2371 (2016). Even the McDonnell opinion noted that the jury could have reasonably found 
McDonnell guilty under the new jury instructions. See id. at 2374–75. 
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appeals more frequently.140 However, McDonnell’s impact will be best 
learned by reviewing the decisions of district courts applying 
McDonnell’s new standard at trial. Appellate review is deferential—
appellate courts must only decide whether the trial court’s decision 
met a certain standard of review, such as the plain error rule and 
sufficiency of the evidence standards. As a result, appellate courts do 
not often actually apply the law to a case’s facts to determine whether 
a person is guilty of the charged crimes.141 In Silver and Skelos, the 
Second Circuit vacated convictions because of procedural 
deficiencies, which did not require the court to find that the 
defendants were innocent.142 As a result, the best way to measure 
McDonnell’s impact is to analyze subsequent corruption trials and 
examine how the new definition of official act—which the jury likely 
will hear verbatim in the court’s jury instructions—may have affected 
the outcome. 
No major corruption trials have reached a decision since the 
Supreme Court issued the McDonnell decision. The trial of Robert 
Menendez, a United States Senator from New Jersey facing 
 
 140. Although circuit courts are beginning to hear more of these cases, the Supreme 
Court is not. Jack Newsham, Supreme Court Won’t Review NYC Lawmaker’s Bribery 
Case, LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2017, 3:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/893944/supreme-
court-won-t-review-nyc-lawmaker-s-bribery-case [https://perma.cc/D29C-AFJC (staff-
uploaded archive)] (reporting that the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari for a 
McDonnell-based appeal). 
 141. See United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 288–89 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A]n appellate 
court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant 
demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than 
subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights, 
which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (citations omitted)); Silver, 864 F.3d at 113 (“We 
review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, but must uphold the conviction if 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Vernace, 
811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016))). 
 142. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. In Silver, the Court suggested 
the opposite and openly acknowledged their limitations when reaching its decision: 
We recognize that many would view the facts adduced at Silver’s trial with 
distaste. The question presented to us, however, is not how a jury would likely 
view the evidence presented by the Government. Rather, it is whether it is clear, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a rational jury, properly instructed, would have 
found Silver guilty. Given the teachings of the Supreme Court in McDonnell, and 
the particular circumstances of this case, we simply cannot reach that conclusion. 
Accordingly, we are required to vacate the honest services fraud and extortion 
counts against Silver, as well as the money laundering count. 
Silver, 864 F.3d at 124. 
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corruption charges, was the first major opportunity to evaluate 
McDonnell’s impact on these types of crimes.143 The McDonnell 
decision loomed large over the proceedings: the judge declared that 
this trial was the first time a trial court had been required to craft jury 
instructions reflecting McDonnell’s official act standard.144 The judge 
quoted McDonnell when instructing the jury on the definition of 
official act,145 and the attorneys for both parties focused on this 
definition in their closing arguments.146 However, the jury could not 
reach a unanimous verdict, causing the judge to declare a mistrial.147 
Consequently, McDonnell’s impact on corruption trials remains 
unclear.148 Once more courts consider McDonnell-based claims and 
identify its application to different potential official acts, the 
decision’s true impact may be properly measured.149 
 
 143. See Nick Corasaniti, Menendez Trial Judge Rejects Motion to Dismiss the Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/nyregion/menendez-
corruption-trial-dismissal-denied.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2KSZ-3D9U (dark archive)] 
(reporting on the decision by the court to reject a motion to dismiss and send the case to a 
jury); Bill Wichert, Menendez Jury Instructions Crafted With Eye On McDonnell, LAW360 
(Oct. 31, 2017, 10:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/980047/menendez-jury-
instructions-crafted-with-eye-on-mcdonnell [https://perma.cc/WL7J-SWLT (staff-
uploaded archive)] (explaining that the New Jersey federal judge would be the first trial 
court to apply McDonnell to jury instructions). 
 144. Wichert, supra note 143. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Charles Toutant, Jury Begins Deliberations in Menendez Trial After Being 
Told of Narrower Standard for Bribery, N.J. L.J. (Nov. 06, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2017/11/06/jury-begins-deliberations-in
-menendez-trial-after-being-told-of-narrower-standard-for-bribery/ 
[https://perma.cc/F3GS-HJJJ (staff-uploaded archive)].  
 147. Nick Corasaniti & Nate Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez 
Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16
/nyregion/senator-robert-menendez-corruption.html [https://perma.cc/34GY-P5NU (dark 
archive)]. One former prosecutor predicted this outcome because he thought “the 
government had a fairly unusual theory of prosecution, the stream of benefits theory, with 
the constraints imposed by McDonnell.” Charles Toutant, Amid Deadlock and Juror 
Remarks, Is Menendez Trial Foundering?, N.J. L.J. (Nov. 13, 2017, 7:07 PM), 
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2017/11/13/amid-deadlock-and-juror-
remarks-is-menendez-trial-foundering/ [https://perma.cc/G2NJ-88E6]. 
 148. A Menendez retrial could have helped clarify McDonnell’s impact, but the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office decided against retrying Menendez after the trial judge dismissed some 
of Menendez’s charges. Nick Corasaniti, Justice Department Dismisses Corruption Case 
Against Menendez, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31
/nyregion/justice-department-moves-to-dismiss-corruption-case-against-menendez.html 
[https://perma.cc/B7HA-MG5H (dark archive)].  
 149. The 2018 calendar year may provide that opportunity with the scheduled Silver 
and Skelos retrials and other upcoming corruption trials. See Devlin-Brown & Dee, supra 
note 60, at 985 (explaining that “prosecutors have continued to bring aggressive public 
corruption cases” and providing examples of such cases which may soon be resolved); 
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B. Additional Limitations When Measuring McDonnell’s Impact 
Even as more courts begin to apply McDonnell, the opinion’s 
circumstances and novelty means that several fact-specific 
interpretations of the precedent are needed to fully understand its 
impact. The Supreme Court adopted a pretty narrow definition of 
“official act” to hold McDonnell’s meeting with government officials 
to promote Williams’ product—his most suspect action—as a non-
official act.150 As a result, this holding does not lend itself to a rule of 
general applicability. Further, the Court provided only a few 
examples of official acts151 and a few related examples of what 
constitutes acting on a specific question, the second element of an 
official act.152  Having only a few examples illustrating a narrow 
holding does not help draw the line much, either. In addition, the 
Court only offered a general description for what actions amount to a 
formal exercise of government power—the first element of the 
definition of official act. 153  The Court explained that it means 
something “similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a 
determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.”154 
Although observers and future litigants know that a formal exercise 
of government power is one of the above three examples, public 
officials act in many more ways. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint 
what actions satisfy the elements of an official act. 
 
Rosner & Whitehouse, supra note 138 (noting the upcoming dates of the Silver and Skelos 
retrials). 
 150. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016); see Silverglate & 
Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 205. 
 151. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370 (stating that “a decision or action to initiate a 
research study,” “a decision or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list 
of potential research topics,” “[a] public official .	.	. using his official position to exert 
pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’” and “a public official us[ing] his 
official position to provide advice to another official, knowing or intending that such 
advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official .	.	. can [all] qualify as a 
decision or action for purposes of §	201(a)(3).”).  
 152. Id. at 2370–71; see supra notes 34, 37–40 and accompanying text (stating the 
second element of an official act and discussing its application in McDonnell). Examples of 
the second element, making a decision or acting on some question, include public officials, 
acting in their official capacity: (1) initiating research studies, or at least taking a 
“qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics”; (2) 
pressuring “another official to perform an ‘official act’”; (3) “provid[ing] advice to another 
official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by 
another official”; (4) agreeing to “make a decision or take an action on a ‘question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’” Id. at 2370–72. 
 153. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368–69. 
 154. Id. at 2372 (emphasis added). 
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These vague descriptions offer courts considerable flexibility 
when they apply the McDonnell precedent. Taken together, the 
examples and definitions that the Court provided will only mandate a 
clear outcome in just a few types of cases. Thus—despite the Court’s 
attempt to narrow the definition of official act and its narrow 
holding155—in most corruption cases, lower courts will be applying a 
broad framework. Even those who support the spirit of the holding in 
McDonnell think future courts have considerable flexibility to 
determine that an official’s action is an official act under corruption 
laws.156 Given this uncertainty, courts could choose to focus more on 
other elements of public corruption statutes, such as the charged 
official’s mens rea.157 Doing so would allow courts to interject their 
own policy conclusions about the political process into the McDonnell 
official act definition, resulting in case law that bases corruption 
convictions on certain acts which the McDonnell Court may have 
intended to exclude.158 Ultimately, more cases are needed to flesh out 
this opaque precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though McDonnell resulted from a unanimous Court, this 
decision should be read narrowly because of its questionable analysis 
of corruption laws and policy concerns. In adopting a narrow 
definition of official act, the Court relied on policy arguments that, on 
their face, seem persuasive. However, closer examination of the 
Court’s policy and legal arguments reveals that the Court did not 
understand the broader picture. It failed to consider how people 
 
 155. See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Devlin-Brown & Monju, supra note 94 (“[T]he further any one of the legs of 
the quid pro quo is from the heartland of political corruption, and the closer it is to the 
typical functioning of representative government, the less likely a jury will be to convict 
and the less likely a court will be to uphold a conviction. [Only] [w]hen the prosecution 
has little evidence of official acts beyond mere access, a McDonnell defense may be the 
most attractive.”); Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 204 (arguing that this 
definition, though purportedly narrow, will likely prove to be broad and subject to 
“substantial expansion”). 
 157. For discussion on why courts should do so, see supra III.B. Also, McDonnell’s 
unanimity on the issue of access in politics departs from a usual split among justices on this 
issue. In the most recent cases that disregarded preferential access’s potential impact—
Citizens United and McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)—the majority only had 
five justices. As a result, lower courts could be more skeptical of McDonnell’s true value. 
 158. Lower courts have historically applied more expansive readings of corruption 
crimes, which increases the likelihood of this happening. Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra 
note 107, at 208 (“The other possibility, of course, given the history of expansive readings 
of public corruption statutes, is that the courts of appeals will undercut any specificity 
requirement .	.	.	.”). 
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already distrust their government and mistook a benefactor’s 
improper preferential access as a core element of democracy. It also 
viewed the official act element of bribery in a vacuum, not explaining 
how the other four elements of bribery might quell their concern for 
protecting constituent services. Instead of protecting the political 
process as it hoped, this decision will only make the American public 
more skeptical of its representatives and potentially reduce their 
willingness to participate in the political process. Lower courts have 
not yet fleshed out this new fact-intensive standard. However, those 
future opinions could very well find sufficient facts to broaden 
McDonnell’s narrow, but still ambiguous, standard and focus instead 
on the defendants’ mens rea. Future courts choosing to rely on the 
mens rea element will assuage the McDonnell Court’s concerns about 
undercutting representative democracy and instead result in decisions 
that protect representative democracy—those which punish public 
officials responsive only to special interests. 
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